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Abstract 
Inequality in access to “opportunity” is one of the significant factors determining 
income inequality. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic effects of 
change in the initial allocation of resources and the redistribution of opportunity in 
terms of access to education and health. In this research we use a Computable General 
Equilibrium model, focusing on the initial distribution of educational opportunity and 
allocation of available resources. In our model, the difference among households is 
due to differences in opportunity, skill, and endowments of capital and labor. We 
introduce a method to quantify the opportunity premium. The model is calibrated 
based on Micro Consistent Matrix (MCM) of the Iranian economy. The results 
indicate that redistribution of opportunity and reallocations of educational resources 
can improve all equality indices. An important conclusion is that the income gap 
increases faster than the opportunity gap. Therefore, a reduction in income inequality 
is possible by small improvements in the equality of opportunity. 
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1. Introduction 
In the economics and social sciences literature, there are numerous discussions about equality, 
justice, and government actions. The main point is that meeting equality in a certain area may 
lead to inequality in other areas (Dworkin, 2000). For example, ideal income equality may 
require the inequality of welfare, resources, and opportunity. Because people with different 
levels of comfort, may experience different tastes, may have different preferences, and may 
benefit differently from resources and opportunity. In the meantime, some people believe in the 
necessity of equality of income and a number of people believe in the equality of opportunity. 
Many people got involved in the discussion after John Rawls’s publication of the “Theory of 
justice”. Amartya Sen (1980) believes that individual capabilities should be considered as a 
measure of welfare. On the other hand, some people like Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), and 
Roemer (1993) are considered as pioneers of the theory of equality of opportunity. Other people 
like Dworkin believe in equality of resources.1 
Some of these concepts are clear, although the others are not. For example, the meaning of 
equality of income is largely straightforward, even though the meaning of equality of 
opportunity is not so clear. Nevertheless, it may be said approximately that people should have 
equal opportunity to continue their own desirable life. So by this idea, the exogenous conditions 
which people are not involved to select should be equal.  
Although inequality of income distribution depends on the individual’s efforts, the external state 
has an important effect on income distribution too. In theory of equality of opportunity, the basic 
problem is providing equal opportunity to tailor the specific needs of everyone; people have 
different income levels because they are different in terms of talent, level of education, cultural 
backgrounds, and many other aspects which we call them endowments. In other words, the aim 
of equal opportunity is to prevent, eliminate, or reduce discrimination between individuals to 
generate efficient, motivating, and fair inequality.  
Assigning a numerical value is one of the fundamental problems in measuring opportunity. The 
concept of opportunity has wide dimensions and it is related to discriminated training, education, 
gender, region, health services, environment, and so on. However, the various attempts have 
been made to quantify opportunity. Kranich (1996) did the first attempt by data simulation. After 
this, the great efforts were made to measure equality of opportunity such as [Arlegi(1999), Nieto 
(1999), Bossert (1999), Fluerbaey  (1999 and Van de gaer (1999), and Ok (1997)].2 Kranich 
(1996) approach to measure equality of opportunity is based on axioms. He assumed 
uncompetitive opportunity and thus outlined the features in terms of which equality of 
                                                 
1)  for more information about the difference between these theories refer to Romer (1996), (1998) and 
(2000) as well as Dworkin (1981) and the references of equality in welfare and endowments. 
2 Summary of this literature can be found in the Pergini works (1999). 
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opportunity must be met. He designs an indicator base on the simple sum of parameters then 
measures each of these features. By comparison, the generalized Kranich index of inequality of 
opportunity is very similar to the Gini coefficient. However, the methods of weighting 
parameters are different. Indicators based on education inequality are another approach to the 
measurement of opportunity because access to educational opportunity can be heavily influenced 
by race, gender, region, and income. On the other hand, education is known to offset some of the 
discriminations and a tool for elimination of poverty. This approach is applied in the literature 
more than Kranich methods. In this approach, the benefit of individuals’ education is limited 
because of their residence features. Thus, their right to receive an equal educational opportunity 
is overshadowed by another external opportunity. For example, a kid in a high-income area has 
better access to qualified education than a kid in low income regions. 
In connecting equal opportunity to equal distribution, we concentrate on the impacts of 
opportunity redistribution on income distribution and welfare. The question is whether a more 
equal opportunity can lead to a more equal distribution of income and social welfare? To 
measure these impacts, we introduce a dynamic Computable General Equilibrium model. We 
assume heterogeneous urban and rural households with unequal primary resources and 
endowments. People will reach better skills through education which brings them more income. 
These assumptions will make relationships between education, the distribution of income, and 
welfare. The opportunity index is calculated by the calibration of the model based on the Iranian 
economy. Supposing that government can influence the equality of educational opportunity, we 
will examine the impact of different opportunity redistribution scenarios on income distribution 
and social welfare.    
In the next section, we describe the theoretical framework, the effective factors which could 
affect urban and rural income and skilled labor supply to learn the potential impact of this 
redistribution on economic variables.  In the third section, we introduce a General Equilibrium 
model. In the fourth section, based on the Micro Consistent data Matrix of 1999, the General 
Equilibrium model is calibrated. We analyze this matrix and show how the initial values of the 
wage index, equal opportunity, and “skill premium” are defined. In the fifth section, various 
scenarios of distribution of opportunity between rural and urban areas are introduced. Then we 
examine the effects of opportunity redistribution on economic variables. The last section 
discusses the results and concludes.  
2. Methods  
To analyze the effects of opportunity redistribution on the economy, it is necessary to clarify the 
mechanism of the effects. In this study, it is assumed that the opportunity available to a person 
affects his acquired skills. Therefore, with opportunity, unskilled labor becomes skilled labor. 
Although health, effort, and talent are also important in creating a skilled workforce, they are 
assumed to be homogeneous for simplicity. However, we can follow the same method for 
measuring them. The model is illustrated in the next section in more detail. 
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2.1  Income and opportunity 
To analyze the impacts of redistribution of opportunity on income inequality, we need to identify 
the factors affecting income. In this study, we consider income inequality between regions. The 
same framework is applicable to inequality between different groups. In each region i, 
individuals’ income consists of total labor income (LI) and capital income (KI): 
i i iI LI KI   (1) 
If we show the stock of the capital resources in each region by K, and if r depicts the capital 
return, capital income in each region is: 
.i i iKI K r  (2) 
Let labor wage be displayed by w, then the total income of people of region i from labor is the 
sum of unskilled labor income and skilled labor income: 
. .i i s i uLI SL w UL w   (3) 
where SL stands for skilled labor endowment and UL shows unskilled labor endowment. We 
show  as opportunity available to an individual in a given area during a specific period. Also, 
we assume the skilled labor supply (SL) in this region is determined according to the available 
opportunity (), efforts and talent (φ) and the population of labor (L)3.  
 min , , , 0i i i i i i iSL L L      (4) 
We assume that if health, talent, effort, and opportunity in one region are higher than another, the 
supply of skilled labor in that region is also higher. In other words, skilled labor supply is zero, if 
beta or   is zero. However, with complete opportunity, only skilled labor will be supplied and 
unskilled work force will be zero. Thus, unskilled workers required in this area should be 
provided by other regions. According to these assumptions, we express the skilled and unskilled 
labor supply based on the population of the work force. Therefore labor income is determined 
by:  
. . (1 ). .i i i i s i i i uLI L w L w       (5) 
We also assume that the wage of skilled labor is determined proportionally to unskilled labor 
wage. By definition of opportunity or skill premium index (α), skilled labor wage is: 
(1 ).s i uw w   (6) 
                                                 
3 In complex models the supply labor is determined based on optimal choice between work and leisure.  
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In fact, the skill premium index represents the difference between skilled and unskilled workers’ 
wage caused by accumulated opportunity premium. By substitution, labor income is determined 
by: 
. .(1 ). (1 ). .i i i i i u i i i uLI L w L w         (7) 
 . .(1 ) (1 )
. (1 )
i i u i i i i i
i i u i i i
LI L w
LI L w
    
  
   
   (8) 
Therefore, regional income is re-written as follows: 
. . (1 )i i i i u i i iI K r L w       (9) 
According to this equation, income in each area is a function of the population of labor, health, 
efforts, talent, available opportunity, wage of unskilled labor, skill premium, capital stock, and 
capital return. Knowing the values of these parameters, we can obtain the income level of each 
area and income inequality. This equation implies that: 
1) If the available opportunity increase (ceteris paribus), the regional income will increase. 
2) By increasing the skill premium index (ceteris paribus), the regional income will 
increase.  
3) By increasing unskilled labor wage, the regional income will increase (ceteris paribus). 
4) As well, by increasing the population of the workforce, the regional income will increase 
(ceteris paribus). 
In reality, the analysis of this equation is very complicated. The main reason is that we are not 
able to keep other things as constant. For example, if the available opportunity increases, the 
skilled labor supply will increase. In a simple model, by increasing the skilled labor supply, the 
skilled labor wage and skill premium index will decrease, and as a result, it has a negative impact 
on income too. So, the first statement above is not always true. As well, by increasing the 
population of the workforce, wages of unskilled workers and income premium index will 
decrease which has a negative impact on income. So, the fourth statement is not always true. On 
the other hand, skill premium and income of workforce indicators are determined based on 
supply and demand mechanism and are endogenous. Considering the substitution between labor 
and capital in production technology, the complexity of the analysis is more obvious.  
Facing these complexities, economists and scholars recommended using a General Equilibrium 
approach. General equilibrium models are appropriate tools as there consider various direct 
effects and indirect effects. This structure makes it possible to simulate complex changes of 
variables in a consistent framework. Here, we use a General Equilibrium model to analyze the 
impacts of redistribution of economic opportunity. 
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2.2 General Equilibrium Model 
In the model, some economic variables are endogenous and determined by the interaction of 
economic agents while some others are exogenous. Main endogenous variables are household 
welfare, the income level for economic agents, the activity level of production sectors, demand, 
and supply level of goods and services. Furthermore, prices, wages, and capital return are 
determined endogenously through the interaction of supply and demand in markets. In this study, 
we determine the skill premium index as an endogenous variable. Modeling the redistribution of 
opportunity required that benchmark opportunity index, the population of workforces and capital 
stock are considered as exogenous. 
We introduce the model as a mixed complementary problem following Rutherford (1995). Our 
model is a multi- sector, multi-region, multi-labor framework of a closed economy. Economic 
activities are classified according to labor intensity. This model consists of four production 
activities, four types of goods and services, urban and rural households, other institutions and 
final consumers, skilled and unskilled labor, and capital. In this model, there is a zero-profit 
condition for all of the production activities. There is a market-clearing condition for goods and 
services, capital, and labor. Income balance condition is assumed for households.  
In the next section, only the main equations are introduced. The core part of the model is 
developed in a team of economists and is well-documented. This framework is applied in the 
assessment of the following policies: Cash Subsidy Transfer (Shahmoradi et al., 2011; Manzoor 
& Haqiqi, 2013); Access to Public Services (Mortazavi et al., 2013; Haqiqi & Mortazavi, 2012); 
Resources Boom (Manzoor et al. 2012a; Haqiqi & Bahador, 2015; Haqiqi & Bahalou, 2013); 
Generational Justice (Haqiqi, 2012; Haqiqi et al, 2013); Trade Barriers (Haqiqi & Bahalou, 
2013) ; Labor Market Policies (Haqiqi & Bahalou, 2015; Manzoor and Bahaloo, 2015); 
Environmental Emissions (Manzoor and Haqiqi, 2012a); Energy Price Reform (Manzoor et al. 
2010; Manzoor et al. 2012b; Manzoor & Haqiqi, 2012b; Sharifi et al., 2014) ; Energy Efficiency 
(Manzoor et al., 2011; Haqiqi et al., 2013) ; Energy Demand (Manzoor et al., 2012c; Manzoor & 
Haqiqi, 2013); Direct Investment (Manzoor et al. 2013). In this version, we focus on opportunity 
and income distribution.  
2.3 Production structure  
The products are made by unskilled and skilled workers, capital, and intermediate materials. In 
this study, nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) is assumed. In this framework, the cost 
of the production is with a function of composite intermediate (M) and composite value added 
(KL). Considering production behavior in each activity as MCP (mixed complementarity 
problem), the zero profit function for each sector s is: 
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 
 
1
1 1 1, , , , j,
1
1 1 1, , , , j,
0,
0,
s s s
s s s
s KL s KL s M s M s s
s KL s KL s M s M s s
unit revenueCES unit cost function
AL P P p
AL P P p
  
  
 
 
  
  
     
  
 (10) 
  11 1 1, , , , ,s s sKL s L s L s k s k sP P P        (11) 
  11 1 1, , , , ,s s sL s ul s ul s sl s sl sP p p        (12) 
1
11
, ,
ssM s m s m
m
P p        (13) 
Where P is the price level, ω shows the upper layer’s share parameters, 𝜃 is the share parameter 
in the lower layers,  λ denotes the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, β 
shows the elasticity of substitution between intermediate materials, and 𝜌 is the elasticity of 
substitution between labor and capital. Furthermore, s is the manufacturing sector index, j is the 
index of commodities, l is the labor index, and k is the index of capital.  
Costs of intermediate material composite or PM is also a CES function of the price of all 
intermediate commodities (pm). Price of value added composite or PKL is reflecting the capital 
and labor cost index. It is CES combination of composite labor cost index (PL) and capital 
returns (pk). Labor cost index is also a CES function of the wage of unskilled (pul) and skilled 
labor (psl).      
2.4 Modeling the supply and demand of skilled and unskilled labor 
Generally, the demand for skilled labor is a function of its wage (psl), the level of production 
activity (ALs), simple labor wage (pul), the efficiency of capital (pk) and other costs of production 
(PM). Market clearance condition for the skilled labor market in MCP form is: 
, ,0, 0,sl i i i sl s sl i i i sl s
i s i s
P L D P L D              (14) 
 
, ,0
, , , , ,
, , ,
1
1 1 1, , , ,
s s s
s s s
KL s L sKLM
sl s KL s L s sl s s sl s
KL s L s sl s
KLM KL s KL s M s M s
P PPD AL D P P P
P P P
  
  
  
   
                     
 
 (15) 
Where AL, D, and D0, are activity level, demand function, and the benchmark demand level 
respectively. This function implies that the demand for skilled labor increase as wage falls or the 
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activity level rises. Note that the elasticity of substitution amplifies the effects of change in 
relative prices. Similarly, the labor market in MCP form and in CES cost function is: 
, ,(1 ) 0, 0,ul i i i ul s ul i i i ul s
i s i s
P L D P L D               (16) 
, ,
, , , , ,
, , ,
s s s
KL s L sKLM
ul s KL s L s ul s s ul s
KL s L s ul s
P PPD AL D P P P
  
                          (17) 
The interaction of demand and supply of capital in MCP form is determined by: 
, ,0, 0,k k k s k k k s
s s
P S D P S D         (18) 
,
, , , ,
, ,
s s
KL sKLM
k s KL s k s s k s
KL s k s
PPD AL D P P
 
                 (19) 
Where capital supply is exogenous. The interaction of supply and demand in these equations 
endogenously determines the wage of skilled and unskilled labor as well as the rate of return of 
capital. 
2.5 Calibration and data 
The model is calibrated based on the 2001 Micro Consistent data Matrix for the Iranian 
economy. The model consists of six categories of variables. It includes (1) Activity levels, (2) 
Levels of supply and demand, (3) Share parameters, (4) Elasticity of substitution, (5) Price 
indices, and (6) Opportunity indices. We calculate the initial values of the endogenous variables 
and model parameters based on this dataset. But the figures in MCM are based on transactions 
value- there are neither price levels nor quantities. We have to use the Harberger (1969) method 
for extracting prices and quantities for our General Equilibrium model. The method assumes 
unity as the initial values of all price indexes, wages, rate of return, and level of activity on the 
base year. Hence, we can simply calculate the quantity variables such as the amount of supply 
and demand. Share parameters are also calculated based on the cost share in MCM. However, we 
need more information for calculation of opportunity difference.  We calculate this index using 
the labor population and labor wage. Economic data often reflect the total income of skilled and 
unskilled labor in a region by which we can compute the wage index, opportunity index, and 
skill premium index according to the following equation. 
 
i
i
i
SL
L             
(20) 
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1 1s i i
u i i
w IS LS
w IU LU    
 (21) 
2.6 Micro Consistent Matrix 
Micro Consistent data Matrix is a rectangular Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). In this modified 
SAM, each column represents the income (revenues) and expenses of an economic agent. On the 
other hand, each row shows supply and demand in a particular market. In this table, positive 
values are income or supply and negative values exhibit costs or demand.  Table 1 shows the 
simplified version of the matrix used in this study. This table includes urban and rural 
households’ income which is originated from labor and capital. It shows the contribution of labor 
and capital in the production of each activity. In addition, this matrix demonstrates the allocation 
of resources (capital and labor) among different sectors in the Iranian economy. 
Table 1: 2001 Micro Consistent Matrix for the Iranian economy (Billions of Rls, domestic currency) 
 Agriculture Oil and Gas 
Industry, 
mining Services 
Urban 
household 
Rural 
household 
Other 
Inst. 
Agriculture 110,198 -178 -60,721 -5,223 -26,120 -24,335 6,379 
Oil and Gas 0 111,679 -10,864 0 0 0 -100,815 
Industry and Mining -23,356 -2,206 249,867 -54,453 -137,606 -66,101 33,855 
Services -4,235 -650 -18,199 431,058 -116,846 -26,367 -264,760 
Capital -78,239 -106,578 -113,084 -271,382 195,667 89,227 284,388 
Skilled labor, urban -889 -1,534 -26,745 -77,759 106,927 0 0 
Unskilled labor, urban -54 -116 -4,475 -3,735 8,379 0 0 
Skilled labor, rural -3,202 -337 -11,494 -17,026 0 32,059 0 
Unskilled labor, rural -224 -81 -4,286 -1,480 0 6,070 0 
Transfers 0 0 0 0 -30,400 -10,553 40,953 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2001 Input Output table and labor statistics from the Statistical Center of Iran. 
 
As this table depicts, the rural household income out of unskilled and skilled labor are 6070 and 
32059 billions of Rls respectively. While the total income of urban households out of unskilled 
and skilled labor are 8379 and 106927 billions of Rls respectively. 
Table 2: information on population and labor income  
Population** Income of labor*  
  Urban 
14,047 115,306 Total urban workforce 
2,847 8,379 Unskilled workers in urban 
11,200 106,927 Skilled workers in urban 
  Rural 
6,391 38,129 Total rural workforce 
4,050 6,070 Unskilled workers in rural 
2,341 32,059 Skilled workers in rural 
*Source: micro consistent matrix (billions of Rls) 
**Source: Statistical Center of Iran (thousands of people) 
Table 2 shows the population of skilled and unskilled labor in urban and rural regions as well as 
their income. The information combined with mathematical equation 20 is used to compute the 
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opportunity index for rural and urban areas and to calculate the income out of opportunity. Table 
3 shows the calculated indices based on this information. Our very early but very important 
finding is that the index of opportunity for urban households is much more than doubles of the 
opportunity for rural households. In other words, the opportunity is not distributed equally 
among rural and urban regions in Iran.  
Table 3: opportunity index for urban and rural households 
Income out of opportunity Opportunity index in the base year  
73964 0.80 Urban households 
28550 0.37 Rural households 
Resource: research computing 
3. Results  
We assume complete redistribution of opportunity. Total opportunity endowment of the 
economy is distributed between urban and rural households. In the first scenario, the share of the 
urban household out of opportunity endowment is 10%, in the second scenario it is 20%, in the 
third scenario it is 30%, and so in the ninth scenario is 90%. On the other hand, the share of rural 
households in the first scenario is 90%, in the second scenario is 80%, in the third scenario is 
70% and so in the ninth scenario is 10%. The question is how the inequality of income changes 
due to redistribution of opportunity in each scenario. Figure 1 shows the urban to rural income 
ratio as well as urban to rural opportunity ratio. The urban to rural income ratio is always more 
than one. In other words, the total income of urban is greater than the total income of rural as the 
urban area is more populated. To have a precise analysis we should compare the income on a per 
capita basis.  
 
Figure 1. a comparison of income ratio with urban opportunity ratio to rural. This figure illustrates the total income of 
urban is higher than rural income. 
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Figure 2 shows urban to rural per capita income ratio. Using this figure, we find out the per 
capita income equality of urban and rural occurs somewhere between the third and fourth 
scenarios. There, the per capita income is almost the same for rural and urban households.  In 
other words, the urban to rural per capita income ratio is between 0.97 and1.09, if the 
opportunity share of rural households is between 30% and 40%. So we can achieve equality of 
per capita income if the opportunity share of urban households is between 60% and 70%.   
 
Figure 2. comparison of urban per capita income ratio to rural with urban per capita opportunity to rural. This figure 
illustrates the ratio of urban to rural per capita income. 
Table 4 shows these figures. Look at two extreme cases. The ninth scenario illustrates that the 
per capita income of urban will be roughly one-half of per capita income of rural if rural 
households have 90% of opportunity. In contrast, If 90% opportunity is devoted to urban 
households, the per capita income of them will be nearly 1.3 of rural per capita income.  
Table 4: income inequality in the distribution of opportunity for different scenarios 
sc9 sc8 sc7 sc6 sc5 sc4 sc3 sc2 sc1  
0.53 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.86 0.97 1.09 1.20 1.30 Urban to rural per capita income  
0.05 0.11 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.68 1.06 1.82 4.10 Urban to rural per capita opportunity  
1.15 1.36 1.53 1.68 1.89 2.13 2.39 2.63 2.86 Urban to rural income  
0.11 0.25 0.43 0.67 1.00 1.50 2.33 4.00 9.00 Urban to rural opportunity  
Resource: computing of research 
We find another interesting relationship. By increasing inequality of opportunity, inequality of 
income is growing faster and the income gap will be larger than the opportunity gap. This 
implied that we can enjoy further percentage reduction in income inequality by declining one 
percentage of opportunity inequality. In other words, we can see a further reduction in income 
inequality with a decline in inequality opportunity. 
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Figure 3. Change in per capita income, with change for the opportunity. This figure illustrates we can see a further 
reduction in income inequality with a decline in inequality in opportunity. 
4. Summary and conclusions  
One of the most important determinants of income distribution is how to allocate resources and 
opportunity in society. Therefore, individuals with more opportunity are able to achieve higher 
levels of income. In other words, equality of income requires equality in opportunity distribution. 
Although equal opportunity is necessary for income equality, it is not enough. 
In this study, we analyzed the effects of redistribution of opportunity on income inequality and 
distribution in Iran in a general equilibrium model. This study proves that if per capita 
opportunity for urban and rural households are equal, we achieve income equality. In other 
words, equality of opportunity can be brought equality of per capita income.  
The important achievement of this study is the relationship between the income gap and the 
opportunity gap. We found faster growth in per capita income gap by increasing opportunity gap. 
In the other words, the decrease in the inequality of income is higher than the decrease in 
inequality of opportunity that means by increasing the inequality of opportunity the inequality of 
income will be greater than the inequality of opportunity. As a result, we strongly recommend 
cutting the opportunity gap which leads to a further reduction in the income gap.  
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